Spring Cleaning by Saul Singer Jerusalem Post May 16, 2002 For a conflict that is ostensibely bereft of military solutions, Operation Defensive Shield has certainly shaken things up. The IDF's military thrust has produced a number of significant results. The most obvious is the immediate and substantial reduction in terrorist attacks. But even more significant are three effects that none of those who counseled against "quick fix" operations seemed to anticipate. The first pleasant surprise is that, even though the operation was tightly circumscribed in time, it has greatly increased the IDP's anti-terror capabilities in subsequent, smaller operations. By capturing hundreds of wanted terrorists, and by proving that nowhere (at least in the West Bank) is safe from the IDF, the security forces reaped an intelligence bonanza that is so far giving Israel the upper hand. Inaddition, Defensive Shield raised the level of military operation that has become politically acceptable. Frequent, pinpoint incursions into Palestinian-controlled areas are understood, because in comparison to Defensive Shield they are not worth mentioning. But the most unanticipated coattail of this operation is a sudden across-the-board interest in Palestinian political reform. Not only are US President George W.Bush and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon talking about it, but even Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat is trying to hop on the bandwagon. Courtesy of the IDF, the Palestinians seem to be on the verge of some political spring cleaning. Sensing the mood on the street, Arafat told the Palestinian Legislative Council yesterday, "Our internal situation after the recent Israeli attacks needs a comprehensive review of all aspects of Our life." He also proposed the "immediate" preparations for elections (it was unclear for whom) "that would lead to fulfilling the principle of separation of powers." Arafat's audience, it seems, listened with some skepticism. Bassam Abu Sharif, an Arafat adviser, echoes the call for new elections, but he also wants council elections, which Arafat is likely to oppose. And legislator Hatem Abdel Kader warned, "We don't want independence of the legal system just on pape. We want it on the ground." The legislators know that Arafat's promises of reform are about as dependable as his commitments to end terrorism. Accordingly, the main focus of reformers is to create new centers of power - such as a prime minister, an independent judiciary, and a unified security force. The US, Israel, and many Palestinians would like nothing better than for Arafat to be, "kicked upstairs" into some symbolic role. The record of such attempts, unfortunately, is not encouraging. It took centuries, for example, to transform England from a true monachy to a nation in which the royal lfamily wields only symbolic power. In China, Chairman Mao managed to mastermind the devastating Cultural Revolution even after he was ostensibiy "kicked upstairs." tHE diffiCulty in stripping symbolic leaders of their power is that their power is ultimately derived from their symbolism. Arafat, of course, has amassed considerable physical powers of coercion, which could conceivably be stripped away. But could fundamental questions, such as whether to disarm Hamas and Islamic Jihad, be decided against his will? Until now, Arafat has been able to use the legitimacy he derives from representing Palestine to override the legitimacy he loses from supporting terrorism. If the world - the US, Europe, or best yet, the Palestinians, themselves - decides that the Palestinian cause must be purged of terrorism, then Arafat would have to lead in this direction or be swept away. The Palestinians may be the least likely to lead such a move, but they clearly have the most to gain from it. Europe, if it really cared a whit about the Palestinians, would make all of its aid conditional on such a crackdown. The American heart is clearly in the right place, but even the Bush administration is not only unready to threaten Arafat with a full-blown regime change, but routinely speaks of him as the only legitimate Palestinian leader. In other words, for all the welcome talk about the need for democracy, transparency, and reform, none of the parties with the power to make it happen has been willing to stick its neck out for it. The reform effort only has a chance if Arafat's alternatives are even less palatable. A half-hearted effort, in contrast, would be costly. Those who took on the monarchies of old, we must remember, often paid for it with their heads.