Making a habit of snatching defeat from the jaws of victory
By Moshe Arens
Ha'aretz Newspaper 
Tuesday, April 17, 2001  

     In its years of struggle for independence and security against
overwhelming odds, Israel has served as an example to the world 
of how victory can be snatched from the jaws of defeat. Recent 
years, however, are providing examples of just the opposite: 
Israel is snatching defeat from the jaws of victory. It started 
in 1987 with the Palestinian Intifada. While victorious in the 
past against the attacking regular armies of the neighboring Arab 
countries, Israel at first found it difficult to contend with mass
civilian  unrest by Palestinian men, women, and children in Judea, 
Samaria, and Gaza. The late Yitzhak Rabin, who was Defense Minister 
at the time, saw his instructions to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 
to use brutal methods against  civilian demonstrators and to close 
schools and universities, produce counterproductive results - 
attracting the attention of the world's media, arousing sympathy 
for the Palestinian cause, creating the impression that Israel was 
deaf to Palestinian complaints and aspirations.

     It was only in the following years that Israel learned to deal 
effectively with the Intifada. A serious effort to avoid fatalities 
among Palestinians, a more humane attitude toward the Palestinian 
population, the reopening of schools and universities, and the 
government's announced readiness to negotiate with representatives 
of the Palestinian population in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza produced 
results. 

      By 1992, the year of the Madrid conference that brought 
together Israeli and Palestinian negotiators for the first time, 
the Intifada had run out of steam. It seemed that Israel, after 
five difficult years, had scored a victory, proving that 
Palestinian demands would not be imposed on Israel through the 
use of violence, and that only negotiation could lead to an 
accommodation between Israel and the Palestinians. It was a 
victory for Israeli determination and staying power.

      That is until the Oslo fiasco. The Labor government that 
came to power in 1992 abandoned the negotiations in Washington 
with Palestinian representatives that followed the Madrid 
conference. Instead they adopted the private, surreptitious 
talks that were carried out by Israeli academics with 
representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 
in Oslo. Thus, in one fell swoop, Israel abandoned the 
long-standing principle that it would  negotiate only with 
representatives of the Palestinian population in Judea, Samaria, 
and Gaza.

      Before we knew it, the Labor government had foisted Arafat 
and his PLO entourage on the hapless Palestinian population, 
given recognition to the Palestinian "diaspora" that Arafat 
claimed to represent, and acknowledged Arafat's demand for the 
"right of return" as a subject for negotiations. Israel provided 
legitimacy to Arafat's claim that he was not a terrorist, but 
a freedom fighter seeking the "peace of the brave" We laid out 
the red carpet for him that led right into the Oval Office at 
the White House. Impatience and fuzzy thinking led Israel to 
snatch defeat from the jaws of victory. All of Israel is now 
paying the penalty for this mistake.

      Next came the IDF's withdrawal from Lebanon. After years 
of inconclusive battles with the Hezbollah, leading to a mounting 
toll of casualties, the Netanyahu government in June 1999 ordered 
the Israeli Air Force (IAF) to attack infrastructure targets in 
Lebanon in response to Hezbollah's Katyusha rocket shelling of 
the Galilee. It had been clear for years that the real 
responsibility for the Hezbollah attacks lay with Hafez Assad in 
Damascus and his Lebanese puppets. They were now finally called
to account. The result was a reestablishment of Israel's deterrent 
posture - an instant cessation of Katyusha shelling and a drastic 
reduction of Hezbollah activity.

      On election to office, Barak decided to abandon this strategy. 
He restricted the IDF to the unfortunate "Grapes of Wrath" 
understandings, and placed his faith in Assad, whom he showered 
with praise. The result was Hezbollah's return to its old ways and 
more IDF casualties. When Assad refused to accept Barak's offer of 
the Golan Heights, Barak decided to withdraw the IDF unilaterally 
from the South Lebanon security zone - abandoning Israel's ally, 
the South Lebanon Army (SLA), in the process. The withdrawal 
turned into a rout. The Hezbollah as well as their Palestinian
admirers took it as proof that Israel did not have the staying 
power to defend itself against lengthy guerrilla activity. Defeat 
was snatched from the jaws of victory.

      There is little doubt that the Lebanon withdrawal served as 
fuel for the current Al-Aqsa Intifada. Arafat knows that Israel is 
capable of overcoming the Palestinian violence, but he is counting 
on Israel not having the staying power to handle an extended period 
of violence. By now it should be clear to Israel that giving in to 
violence is only going to lead to further violence. Refusing to 
negotiate unless the Palestinian violence ceases has become the 
acid test of Israel's determination to protect its interests. 

It is a choice between victory and defeat.

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