Oslo - A Monumental Error
by Moshe Arens
Ha'aretz Newspaper -- 30 May 2001

At this point, after Yasser Arafat rejected Ehud Barak's offer of
Israeli concessions and unleashed the Al-Aqsa Intifada, there is 
probably little disagreement that those who thought they saw in 
Arafat a partner for the "peace of the brave" and granted him 
Israel's recognition as its negotiating partner at Oslo in 1993 
committed a monumental error.

It is they who gave legitimacy to this arch-terrorist, enabling the 
Nobel Peace Prize Committee to award him the Nobel Peace Prize in 1994; 
and they, as part of the Oslo accords, who provided him with the 
weapons that permitted him to launch his murderous campaign against 
Israel. They refused to believe his pronouncements that he represented 
the Palestinian "diaspora" and demanded for them the "right of return," 
nor to take seriously the military uniform he insisted on wearing.

They fostered the illusion that Arafat would moderate his positions, 
and that peace with the Palestinians was around the corner - if only 
Israel would be generous in the concessions it offered to Arafat. In 
the meantime, the Nobel Peace Prize Committee has gone on to consider 
other candidates for its prize, while Israel now has to deal with daily 
acts of Palestinian terror.

When, in recent history, have a country's leaders made errors of such
magnitude? The obvious example that springs to mind is Neville
Chamberlain at Munich in 1938. He, too, refused to take Hitler's 
rhetoric seriously, believing that he had met a man "you could do 
business with," and that the Munich agreement had achieved "peace in 
our time" It only took a few months before he and the rest of the free 
world were disabused of these illusions.

In 1948, Henry Wallace, who had been Franklin Roosevelt's vice president
and who had broken with the Democratic Party, ran for the White House as 
the leader of the Progressive Party. He was convinced that Stalin was
genuinely interested in peace with the West, and that Truman's strategy 
of confronting Soviet expansionism was leading the world to nuclear war. 
Unlike Chamberlain in his time, Wallace was fortunately not in a position 
to apply his mistaken policies, but many of his supporters continued their 
"peace" campaigns right up to the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Just like Chamberlain and Wallace, Israel's leaders at Oslo were blind
to reality, preferring instead to engage in wishful thinking. Similarly,
Israel's leaders at Oslo convinced themselves and their followers that
they were the prophetic messengers of a vision of peace.

At Oslo in 1993, Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres were, no doubt, influenced
in their thinking by the Intifada that broke out in 1987. Rabin, at the
time, was the Defense Minister and Peres was the Foreign Minister in the
National Unity government led by Yitzhak Shamir. Rabin's policy of
heavy-handed repression of Palestinian demonstrators and closure of
their schools and universities was unsuccessful. It was during his tenure 
as Defense Minister that then-Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces
Dan Shomron declared there was no military solution to the Intifada,
implying that Israel had no choice but to give in to Palestinian demands. 
It was only after Peres had brought about the downfall of the National 
Unity Government, a Likud-led government was established and Rabin had 
left the Defense Ministry that the Intifada was brought under control.

The measures used included the deployment of the IDF's elite units in
Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, while simultaneously avoiding, as far as 
possible, fatalities among the Palestinian population; keeping open 
dialogues with Palestinian personalities; giving aid and encouragement 
to Palestinian business entrepreneurs; and gradually reopening all 
schools and universities. By the time the Labor Party came to power 
in 1992, the Intifada was over. But they went straight for the disaster 
at Oslo.

Now, dealing with the Al-Aqsa Intifada is far more difficult for two
reasons: The first is the large quantity of automatic weapons in the
hands of the Palestinians - weapons supplied, courtesy of the Israeli
government, as part of the Oslo accords. The second is the fact that 
the Palestinian Authority is in control of the areas labeled "A," which 
provide a safe haven for the preparation of acts of terror and violence 
against Israelis. For the violence to be suppressed, certain strategic 
locations in the "A" zone will have to be occupied by the IDF, and a 
maximum effort will have to be made to reduce the number of guns in 
the hands of the Palestinians and to prevent the introduction of even 
heavier weapons.

The effort will have to be made. A return to talk that there is no
military solution - implying that Israel has no choice but to give 
in to Arafat's demands - is a prescription for disaster.