Why Israel Rejects 'Observers'
Wall Street Journal Europe
July 3, 2001

By Saul Singer, the editorials editor of, 
and a columnist for, the Jerusalem Post

JERUSALEM -- On Friday, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell 
dropped what to Israeli ears sounded like a bombshell. Standing 
next to Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat in Ramallah, 
Mr. Powell said, "I think as we get into the confidence-building 
phase there will be a need for monitors and observers to ... make 
an independent observation of what has happened."

Within hours, Mr. Powell shot down his own trial balloon by 
ruling out any monitoring mechanism opposed by Israel. And with 
yesterday's terrorist bombings in the Israeli city of Yehud, the 
matter of "confidence-building" may already be moot. Still, 
pressure for an observer force is bound to increase. The 
international community will wonder why Israel should so 
adamantly refuse what seems like a sensible measure for its own 
security -- unless, of course, Israel has something to hide. 
This, in turn, serves the propaganda purposes of the Palestinian 
Authority. As Mr. Arafat asked last weekend at a Lisbon meeting 
of the Socialist International, "Why does the government of 
Israel reject the dispatching of international observers to
consolidate and protect the cease-fire?"

Actually, a cursory glance at history shows that the reason for 
Israel's objection is the same as for Mr. Arafat's enthusiasm: 
International observers will not protect the cease-fire, but 
Mr. Arafat's ability to violate it. The long record of 
international observers in the Arab-Israeli conflict is 
unblemished by a single sustained example, when tested, of basic 
fairness toward Israel, let alone protection from Arab aggression.

Discouraging Record

The discouraging record begins even before the founding of the 
state. In his autobiography, David Ben-Gurion recalls when the 
British, then governing Palestine, took the term "observer" to 
extremes. On April 13, 1948, a convoy of ambulances and armored 
buses headed for Hadassah hospital on Mount Scopus. Two hundred 
meters from the British military post that was supposed to secure 
the route, the convoy came under Arab attack from both sides of 
the road. "The soldiers [at the post]," Ben Gurion reports,
"watched the attack but did nothing." British military cars passed 
three times during the seven hours the convoy was under attack, 
one including Jerusalem's ranking British general, but did not 
stop to intervene or assist. Seventy-seven Jewish academics, 
nurses, and students were massacred that day, after top British 
officials had "personally guaranteed" that medical and civilian 
transports would be protected by the British army and police.

Under the 1949 Armistice Agreement, United Nations Military 
Observers were deployed along the cease-fire lines with Syria, 
Jordan, and Egypt. In the 18 years before the Six Day War changed 
these lines dramatically, there were hundreds, if not thousands, 
of attacks against Israel -- in the 1950s from Egyptian-held 
Gaza and in the 1960s by Fatah, from behind Syrian and Jordanian 
lines. None of these attacks produced a single condemnation by
the United Nations, the body that was ostensibly policing the 
cease-fire lines. The U.N. observers could be relied upon to 
complain, however, whenever Israel retaliated in response to 
Arab attacks.

In more recent times, U.N.IFIL, the U.N. observer force deployed 
in southern Lebanon while Israel fought with Hezbollah there, 
showed that the powers of observation of such forces had become 
no less selective. Former Israeli Ambassador to the United Nations 
Dore Gold recalls the standard pattern: "Hezbollah would launch 
artillery attacks 50 meters away from a U.N.IFIL outpost, Israel 
would shoot back, and U.N.IFIL would protest against the Israeli 
response."

The picture of international observers as neutral pairs of eyes 
and ears has not been borne out in practice. Observers ostensibly 
have a mandate to be impartial, but they do not check the 
interests of the nations they represent at the door. It should not 
be a surprise that the same nations that vote against Israel en 
masse in international bodies have trouble acting fairly when 
serving in an observer force.

Even the United States has bitter experience with the inability 
of international observers to stick to their mandate when it 
conflicts with the policies of the nations that send them. Saddam 
Hussein was able to whittle away the effectiveness of U.N.SCOM, 
the U.N. monitoring effort in Iraq, through constant pressure on 
the relevant capitals to hold him to lower standard. U.N.SCOM's 
fall was a classic case of how even the most dedicated 
international observers ultimately reflect the will and biases
of the bodies that stand behind them, not some objective standard 
of fairness, or even the mandate they are sent to uphold.

In addition to whatever biases national representatives bring to 
the table, Israel also suffers from a structural asymmetry: the 
lack of plausible deniability. These days, Israel is not being 
attacked by armies of sovereign nations or even by the 
Palestinian Authority per se, but by proxies that allow national 
leaders to shirk responsibility. Israel, by contrast, must defend 
itself with its army, and stand behind its actions. Israel will 
always be a more convenient address for international protest
than murky bodies such as Hezbollah or the latest offshoot of Mr.
Arafat's myriad security forces.

Purported Counterexamples

In response to this dismal record, a number of purported 
counterexamples are constantly trotted out: the U.N. 
Disengagement and Observer Force on the Israeli-Syrian border, 
the Multinational Force and Observers in the Egyptian Sinai, and 
Temporary International Presence in Hebron. Yet these examples 
illustrate a point made recently by Foreign Minister Shimon
Peres, "Observers can observe once you have peace. They cannot 
observe a lack of peace." The distinction between peace-making 
and peace-keeping is a vital one. U.N.DOF "works" despite the 
lack of a Syrian-Israeli peace because Syria does not want to 
attack Israel over its own border, preferring instead the 
deniability of supporting Hezbollah's attacks from Lebanon.
Egypt has no interest in violating its demilitarization 
commitments in the Sinai, so Israel does not have a problem with 
the MFO there.

The TIPH is the closest thing to an example of a potentially 
volatile situation that may have been calmed somewhat by an 
international presence. But the TIPH, it is important to note, 
does not report to the United Nations but to Israel, the 
Palestinians, and the governments of its members. It did not 
stop the Palestinian sniper who murdered 10-month-old Shalhevet 
Paz in her stroller in March.

In short, Israel's experience with international observer forces 
ranges from benign to harmful. There is no reason for Israel to 
risk the placement of a one-way mirror between it and the 
Palestinians, with a special glaze that lets through Palestinian 
attacks, while reflecting back Israeli responses straight into 
the court of world opinion.

-- From The Wall Street Journal Europe